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Abstract
In this work, we examine to what extent the Internet’s routing infrastructure needlessly
exposes network traffic to nations geographically irrelevant to packet transmission. We
quantify what countries are geographically logical to see on a network path traveling between
two nations through the use of convex hulls circumscribing major population centers, and
then compare that to the nation states observed in over 14.5 billion measured paths. Our
results show that 49% of paths unnecessarily expose traffic to at least one nation. We
further explore what nations, regions, and ASes expose and benefit from this geographically
illogical traffic. As an example, we see that 23% of source/destination pairs located outside
of the United States send their traffic through the US, but only 8% of those paths are
geographically logical. Finally, we examine what happens when countries exercise both legal
and physical control over ASes transiting traffic, gaining access to traffic outside of their
geographic borders, but carried by organizations that fall under a particular country’s legal
jurisdiction. When considering both the physical and legal countries that a path traverses,
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The Internet is comprised of independent networks called Autonomous Systems (ASes),
which depend on each other for inter-network connectivity. Network traffic must often
traverse multiple ASes in order to reach its final destination. Any adversarial transit AS
situated between sender and receiver, termed a path based adversary, can degrade network
availability, violate data integrity, and undermine confidentiality. While a single malicious
transit AS is a powerful adversary, nation states represent an even stronger path based
adversary. A nation state has the ability to exercise control over both ASes that physically
operate networking infrastructure within its borders and ASes whose corporate governance
falls within the nation state’s legal jurisdiction. A motivated nation state could coerce
multiple ASes into acting as colluding path based adversaries on the nation state’s behalf.
Revelations in recent years have demonstrated the extent to which nation states are
willing to exert pressure on private entities in an effort to execute national cyber policy on
network traffic. For example, the United States, Great Britain, and other members of the so
called Five Eyes intelligence alliance have integrated dragnet surveillance into core Internet
transit links that reside within their borders [7, 24, 8]. Additionally, there exist recorded
instances of censoring nation states such as China applying domestic censorship policies to
network traffic that neither originates nor is bound for domestic sources [25, 11].
Due to the potential security concerns exposure to additional nation states might present,
it is reasonable to expect that the Internet’s routing infrastructure minimizes such exposures.
In scenarios where sender and receiver reside inside the same or adjacent nation states, one
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would expect that these are the only jurisdictions traffic is exposed to. Even in scenarios
where the sender and receiver are located in non-adjacent nations, and exposure to third
party nation states is a physical necessity, one might assume that exposure is limited to a
minimal set of nations required to build a physical link between sender and receiver. However,
data routing decisions focus on the logical network topology rather than the geographic and
political topology. This can result in paths exposing traffic to nations which do not lie
between the geographic locations of the sender and receiver. This excess exposure needlessly
increases the power of certain nation states if they elected to coerce ASes into serving as
path based adversaries on their behalf.
In this work, we examine to what extent the Internet’s routing infrastructure increases
the capacity of certain nation states to undermine security properties of network traffic
beyond what would be predicted. Specifically, we quantify how often network traffic is
exposed to additional nation states beyond those residing along a geographically logical path
between sender and receiver. In order to do this, we examine more than 14.5 billion paths
observed from traceroutes conducted by CAIDA’s Ark measurement framework [ark] from
January 1, 2017 to October 31, 2017. To explore physical exposure of data to nation
states we compare the set of nations where the network infrastructure traversed by a given
path physically resides to the set of nations we might geographically expect to see on a
physical path between the sender and receiver. In order to build the set of geographically
logical countries between sender and receiver we use a novel technique based on computing
a population biased convex hull between the sender and receiver’s home nation states and
constructing the set of all countries that at least partially reside inside the convex hull. We
also explore what happens when nation states, in addition to taking advantage of physical
exposure, additionally exercise control over ASes whose corporate governance operates within
their legal jurisdiction, and leverage that pressure to observe all data handled by such ASes,
something we term legal exposure.
Overall, we find that roughly half, 49%, of examined paths physically expose traffic to at
least one unexpected nation state. We also find that the degree to which a user can expect
their network traffic to not be physically exposed to additional nation states varies widely.
For more than half of our observed source countries more than 60% of their paths contain
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additional nations, and a full third of nations see 75% or more of their paths exposed to
unexpected countries. We see similar asymmetry when it comes to which geographically
illogical nations appear on paths. In our measurements the top ten offending countries
account for 83% of all of the instances of geographically irregular countries seen in paths.
We also see how certain countries disproportionately benefit from this additional exposures,
allowing them to observe and impact more traffic than expected. As an example, we find
that the United States resides on 55% of paths that both start and end in foreign countries,
but is geographically expected to only appear on 8% of those paths.
When we expand to consider paths which either physically or legally expose traffic to
unexpected nation states the situation gets worse. More than 57% of expose traffic to at
least one nation state.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. In Section 2 we will cover both
relevant background on how logical routing decisions are made, along with providing
motivation for our study. In Section 3 we will present our methodology for collecting paths,
labeling countries that the path either physically or legally exposes data to, and lastly how we
build a quantifiable measure of what countries are geographically logical to observe between
source and destination. In Section 3.0.3 we will cover the basic properties of our resultant
datasets. Section 4.1 examines the extent to which nations physically exposure their traffic to
other countries, along with how often that exposure is geographically illogical. Section 4.2
expands this analysis to additionally consider exposure to entities that could be legally




2.0.1 Path Selection On the Internet
The Internet is comprised of a collection of independently administered networks called
Autonomous Systems, or ASes. ASes provide network connectivity to hosts inside of their
network, enabling those hosts to connect to other host located either inside the same AS or in
a remote AS. To this end, ASes deploy special purpose networking equipment called routers
whose job it is to compute the best path between data sender and receiver and forward
data to the next hop (router) in that path. In order to compute best paths, routers execute
routing protocols which facilitate the exchange of topology information between routers and
then use that information to compute best paths. Routing protocols do not compute the
best path to every individual IP address. Instead, routing protocols compute best paths
to blocks of IP addresses, and forward traffic addressed to any host inside that block along
the same path. Routing protocols are typically divided into two categories, inter-AS and
intra-AS routing protocols. Inter-AS routing protocols compute the sequence of ASes data
will travel when moving between remote ASes. Intra-AS routing protocols compute the best
path traffic takes inside of a given AS. Intra-AS routing protocols are responsible for both
getting traffic to a end destination inside the current AS and delivering traffic to a boarder
router that will transfer traffic to the next AS along a multi-AS path.
The Border Gateway Protocol [20], or BGP, is the de-facto standard inter-AS routing
protocol. This single standard routing protocol is a result of the demand for interoperability
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between independently managed organizations that often compete with each other. BGP
is a path vector routing protocol with policies. The policy portion of BGP allows network
administrators to select paths based on arbitrary criteria, rather than simple the shortest
paths. Commonly, ASes utilize their business relationship with neighboring ASes to make
a first pass routing decision. ASes that have direct connectivity with each other typically
form customer-provider relationships, where the customer pays the provider for all traffic
flowing between the two ASes in exchange for connectivity to remote ASes via the provider.
ASes will generally follow a routing policy termed “Valley Free Routing”, where they prefer
routes that are more economically advantageous, however recent measurement studies have
shown that this is not always the case [9].
Because intra-AS decisions only need to be computed over infrastructure held by one
organization, removing the demand for interoperability, there are a myriad of intra-AS
routing protocols deployed. Examples include link state protocols such as IS-IS [19] and
OSPF [18], along with path vector variants such as EIGRP [22]. Most intra-AS protocols
include the ability to include network policy rather than simple network distance as part of
the routing decision making process. This policy is often expressed as an “administrative
distance” giving the algorithm hints as to the adminsitrator’s preferences.
2.0.2 Measuring Utilized Paths
Predicting the exact path data will travel between source and destination is challenging. In
the case of inter-domain routing, AS relationships are closely held secrets. AS relationships
can be inferred with some degree of accuracy based on publicly available BGP mirrors,
sources of information on the current state of the BGP global routing table. However,
as shown most recently by Anwar et. al. [9], using inferred relationships to predict inter-
AS routing paths can be inaccurate. Predicting intra-AS routes is even more challenging.
First, which intra-AS routing protocol an AS is using is a corporate secret, and difficult to
detect. Second, the particular configuration and administrative preferences that factor into
the intra-AS routing protocol’s decision making process are difficult to both infer and to use
as a predictive model accurately.
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An alternative, but more accurate, method for determining the utilized path between
hosts is to execute a traceroute [17] between the two hosts. Traceroute takes advantage
of how networking equipment commonly behaves when it encounters a packet with an
expired Time-To-Live (TTL) field. Often, but not always, routers will respond with an
ICMP message to the sending host, informing the host that the packet expired, and the
IP address at which the packet expired. By sending packets with small, but incrementally
increasing, TTLs, and recording the IP addresses that respond, a host can map the sequence
of routers a packet traverses on its path. While traceroute provides exceptional accuracy,
there are several shortcomings. Most obviously, the source must be under the control of the
measuring party. To overcome this shortcoming, there are several distributed measurement
test-beds that either conduct traceroutes at regular intervals to large portions of the Internet
or conduct traceroutes to specified hosts. Examples of such test-beds include CAIDA’s
Ark Infrastructure [ark] and RIPE’s Atlas Infrastructure [rip]. Another major issue is that
network infrastructure is not obligated to respond when a packet’s TTL expires. In this case
gaps in the full path to the host will result.
2.0.3 Path Based Adversaries
The security properties of many distributed systems can be impacted by the adversarial AS
that transmits data, what we refer to as a path based adversary. As an example, a path based
adversary can trivially violate the confidentiality of any unencrypted traffic. Despite this
obvious threat vector, a recent study by the EFF found that only about half of web traffic is
actually encrypted [13]. More complex attacks undermining confidentially are also possible.
An example of such an attack is an AS that wishes to attempt to de-anonymize users of
Tor, an anonymous communication system. Feamster and Dingledine [12] first pointed out
that an AS that appears on the path between a user and their entry into the Tor network,
as well as appearing between their traffic’s exit point from the Tor network and its final
destination, could undermine the anonymity properties of the Tor network. The integrity
of distributed systems can also be disrupted by adversaries who lie along a utilized path.
Apostolaki et. al. [10] demonstrated that adversaries capable of observing traffic between 900
IP blocks could control and edit interactions between a majority of the computational power
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dedicated to mining Bitcoin, opening up the possibility of double spending via forced forking
of the block chain. Additionally, in 2014 attackers utilized compromised BGP speakers in an
effort to hijack communications between Bitcoin miners and their pool servers [14], resulting
in the theft of Bitcoins current worth approximately $1.3 million USD.
There exist both academic studies and real world examples of adversaries that can control
multiple ASes, becoming exceptionally wide reaching path based adversaries. Johnson et.
al. [15] first expanded the AS level Tor adversarial model to include such powerful adversaries
when they explored the capacity of Internet Exchange Points to de-anonymize Tor users.
Revelations from whistle blowers including both the Snowden leaks [7] and earlier revelations
by the AT&T contractor Mark Klein [8, 24] demonstrated the willingness of the NSA and
other spy agencies such as GCHQ to integrate surveillance devices, and even systems which
actively inject data into network streams inside core network infrastructure located within
their respective nations. In addition to the attacks outlined above, documents have revealed a
complex infrastructure for violating user confidentiality by building relationship graphs based
solely on linking data senders and receivers. Furthermore, there exists evidence of censoring
nation states: for example China either accidentally or intentionally applying censorship




Data potentially falls under the legal jurisdiction of any nation it either physically crosses
or that can exert legal influence over a transit AS utilized en-route to its destination.
From a security perspective, exposing traffic to nations is potentially problematic because
it increases the possibility for malicious activity by every country crossed. Examples of
potential malicious activity includes dropping the data, eavesdropping on the data, and
even changing the contents of the data. While some exposure is unavoidable, any extraneous
nations traffic is exposed to, i.e. those not physically necessary for the propagation of traffic,
needlessly increase this security risk. Our goal is to accurately measure the fraction of paths
which expose network traffic to nations not required for the actual transmission of data,
and to quantify how much of the traffic a nation state can observe and control results from
geographically illogical paths.
The ideal situation for data traveling from nation A to nation B is a path that consistently
moves towards nation B. Phrased differently, we would logically expect network level paths
between two nations to approximately, but not exactly, traverse the shortest path between
those nations. While this definition is simplistic, it does highlight certain path selection
choices that are illogical and should not be observed. For example, a path that goes the
opposite direction than its destination should be considered illogical. Additionally, data
with a destination that lies within the same nation it originated from should almost never
leave that nation.
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In order to quantify how many paths follow geographically illogical routes, and which
countries can exert additional control over traffic as a result, we need to build two datasets.
First, we must establish a set of expected countries traffic could be exposed to during transit
between a particular source/destination pair based on geographic realities. We term countries
inside of this set geographically normal for a given source and destination. Second, we
must establish the actual paths data takes from sources to destinations and establish which
countries the traffic is exposed to. We compute both which countries physically host the
network infrastructure traveled, termed physical exposure, and which countries can exert legal
pressure on the ASes appearing along the path, termed legal exposure. By comparing the set
of countries a path exposes traffic to with the set of geographically normal countries, we can
label the path as either normal, no excess exposure, or a bad path, containing geographically
illogical countries. We can also quantify the number of times a country is a benefactor of
a bad path, specifically the number of additional source destination pairs it can observe as
the result of bad paths.
3.0.1 Computing Geographically Logical Paths
Defining the geographically normal countries for a source/destination pair was done using a
novel technique based on convex hulls. The convex hull of a set of points S in n dimensions
is the intersection of all convex sets containing S. For N points p1, ..., pN, the convex hull




λjρj : λj ≥ 0 ∀j and
N∑
j=1
λj = 1 (3.1)
A more intuitive way to think about the definition of a convex hull is: given a set of points,
what is the shape a stretched rubber band takes when encompassing all of them.
Using Equation 3.0.1, we can build convex hulls containing both the set of points that
define the country containing the source and a set of points that define the country containing
the destination. These convex hulls are computed taking the spherical nature of the Earth
into account. Note that when a country is the source and destination of traffic, we only
consider that country as normal and do not build a convex hull for the single country. This
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convex hull construction efficiently defines all points that lie between source and destination
countries. Source and destination were considered at the granularity of nation state due to
potential limitations in the accuracy of GeoIP location use later; it should be noted that this
coarser granularity only increases the number of countries considered geographically normal.
We then compute the set of geographically normal countries by finding all countries that
either fully or partially fall within this convex hull. In order to detect countries that fully
reside inside the convex hull, we test if any of the 15 largest cities in the given country resides
inside the convex hull. To detect countries that lie only partially inside of the convex hull,
we test if any point along the edge of the convex hull lies inside the borders of a particular
country.
One option for defining the set of points that make up a country is to utilize the nation’s
political borders, provided in the Matic dataset [sha]. In order to test this approach, we
utilized shapefiles which contain points that define polygons of the actual borders of each
country. This approach tends to result in convex hulls between two nations that contain
countries which do not lie in the path between those nations. One factor contributing to
this is countries with non-contiguous territories or remote territorial holdings. An examples
of this is the United State’s convex hull when including Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and other
remote territories, as the resulting convex hull covered roughly one quarter of the earth’s
total surface area. Additionally, the political borders of a country do not necessarily reflect
where bulk the Internet infrastructure of the country is located; as this generally lies in the
more populated areas. Relevant examples of this include China and Russia. To address, this
we built a separate definition of points describing a country using the latitude and longitude
of the top 15 most populous cities in that country [pop].
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the two construction techniques for the path between
China and Mongolia. The population based convex hull results in a stricter version of a
normal path between two countries and accurately reflects the fact that 83% of China’s
population, including all of its major cities, reside in the eastern portion of the country. The
border based convex hull includes countries in the wrong cardinal direction, such as India
and Vietnam, a result of China’s concave shape. For these reasons we chose to use the city
based construction of a convex hull for the measurements contained inside this work.
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Figure 3.1: A comparison of the border based convex hull and population biased convex
hull between China and Mongolia. Note that over 83% of China’s population lives on its
eastern coast. s
3.0.2 Computing Actual Physical and Legal Exposure
To establish the actual path from one IP address to another we utilize a distributed traceroute
measurement framework. As mentioned in Section 2.0.2, there are two widely accepted
options for such a framework. The first, the Ripe Atlas measurement ecosystem, allows for
users to spend credits to do measurements from a set of over 1000 geographically distributed
probes to user chosen endpoints. These measurements are then made publicly available.
This system has been used to appropriately measure subsets of the geographic topology of
the internet in related work by Karlin et. al. [16], which examined paths bound to specific
destinations rather than the Internet as a whole. However, RIPE Atlas’s “on demand” nature
means that it does not uniformly sample the IP space, but rather over samples certain
destinations. Since our work considers the entire topology of the internet another, more
appropriate option exists: CAIDAs Archipelago Measurement Infrastructure (ARK) [ark].
ARK is comprised of 180 monitors that work in teams to send traceroutes to a random IP
address in each block of globally addressable IPs 1 every 48 hours. Note that this does not
imply that each monitor probes each prefix every 48 hours, but that at a single destination
prefix will be probed by one monitor each cycle. This unique measurement system gives us
a uniform sample across the set of possible destinations and taken from a diverse collection
of geographic locations, making it better suitable for measuring the geographic topology of
the internet as a whole.
1Specifically each /24 prefix.
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We collected traceroutes over a 10 month period from January 1, 2017 to October 31,
2017. To process each traceroute in our dataset, we needed to be able to map each IP address
that appears in the path back to the country it is physically located in as well as the AS it is
owned by. Mapping each IP address back to its correct country was done using the Geolite
IP geolocation database [geo]. While the accuracy of geolocation is at times limited in its
precision, it has been shown to be highly accurate at a country level [23]. To best build
the mapping between IP address and owning AS, we consulted snapshots of BGP routing
tables from RouteViews [RouteViews] taken the same day that the traceroute measurement
was done, and assigned ownership to the AS which originated the path for the block of IP
addresses that day. In order to assign which legal jurisdiction has control over that AS, we
simply map the AS back to the country it is registered in based on the IANA registry [ian].
Processing a traceroute, visualized in Figure 3.2, involved converting an IP level path
into an aggregate path of mapped country, AS tuples. When building this new path, we do
not add any hops from the original traceroute measurement where we do not know the AS
or country that the IP address belongs to, nor do we include hops which do not respond with
an ICMP message to the traceroute. This implies that our measurements is a lower bound
on the countries and ASes that the path exposes traffic to. After building this new path, we
compress repeated instances of the same tuple down to a single instance. Finally, to expand
on the number of source/destination paths, we inferred the path from each hop contained
in the built path to the destination, rather than simply that of the originating node, an
inference made possible because of routing routing protocols making forwarding decisions
based only on the destination of the packet. We then label paths as either geographically
normal or “bad” based on sets of expected countries to appear on the path constructed in
Section 3.0.1.
3.0.3 Dataset Overview
The result was a dataset of over 14.5 billion paths from January 1, 2017 to October 31, 2017
to test against our definition of normal. The set of paths involved 13221 distinct ASes and 218
different countries. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the lengths of the paths measured,
where length is defined as the number of AS/country tuples rather than the number of IP
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Figure 3.2: Visualizing the process of processing a single traceroute measurements
hops in the unprocessed path. Note that we expect to see more paths of shorter length due
to the fact that when we see a path of length n, we always also see paths of length n − 1,
n−2, . . . , 1 as a result of our enumeration process. Following an approach utilized in the rest
of the paper, we will briefly examine the high level properties of the dataset at the national,
AS, and regional level.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of tuple path lengths in our dataset.
When we look into the distribution of data at a country level, we see that on average, a
country is involved in approximately 179.8 million paths. This distribution is not uniform
however, as an example, as shown in Table 3.1 we see that each of the top 9 countries is
involved in an order of magnitude more paths than the average case. Furthermore, the
United States is actually physically present in over 80% of the paths in our dataset.
If we consider the dataset at an AS level, we find that the average number of paths each
unique AS is seen in is approximately 3.6 million. Table 3.2 shows the top 10 ASes in terms
of unique paths seen in. Something interesting to note is that only 6 of the top 10 most seen
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Table 3.1: Countries Involved in the Most Paths









ASes actually contain ARK monitors. This highlights the importance of the other 4 ASes
in them in terms of quantity of internet traffic transited. However, it is also important to
clarify that an AS that is adjacent to a monitor AS which is overwhelmingly utilized by the
monitor’s AS, will be seen in more traffic than the monitor AS, due to the way we process
paths, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Table 3.2: ASes Involved in the Most Paths. A majority of which are legally registered in
the United States











Another point of interest in Table 3.2 is that 8 of the top 10 ASes in terms of most
unique paths seen are legally registered in the United States. While this coincides with
the United States physically being involved in over 80% of the paths we have measured,
it is important to note that many ASes actually have physical infrastructure outside of the
country they are legally registered in. Of the 13,221 ASes we have seen in our measurements,
1,880 ASes have been observed to have infrastructure in more than 1 country. Figure 3.4
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shows these 1,880 ASes and the number of unique countries that are observed hosting their
physical infrastructure. Here we see that over 800 ASes have infrastructure in more than
two countries, and one AS was actually measured to have infrastructure in 127 different
countries. We further investigate this trend of the legal exposure vs physical exposure in
Section 4.2.
Figure 3.4: Of the 1,880 ASes we see in our measurements, over 800 ASes have
infrastructure in more than 2 countries.
Finally, we look at the dataset through the lens of regional, at a continent level, paths.
In Table 3.3 we see that both the Americas and Europe are physically present in over half
the paths measured. Furthermore, from what we learned in Table 3.1 we see that the United
States is actually present in more paths than any entire region, with the exception of its
own.
Table 3.3: Number of unique paths we see each region in










We want to quantify the amount of needless geographic exposure from one entity to another.
As a metric of normalcy, we have defined the degree of normality (DoN) between a
particular source and destination as:
DoN =
total ”normal paths” seen
total paths seen
(4.1)
Due to the trivial nature of paths length less than two being correct, we only only
considered paths containing three or more AS, country tuples in our measurements. In this
Section we consider only physical exposure of traffic, in Section 4.2 we explore what occurs
when we additionally consider legal pressure nation states can exert.
Over the entirety of the paths we examined, the total DoN was 0.510. We start our
investigation of DoN by looking at the entirety of the measurements from a few different
angles. First, we examine DoN given the length of the compressed AS, country tuple path.
Figure 4.1 shows that as the number of hops in the path increases, the the DoN continually
degrades. Only paths with 3 hops have a DoN above the global average and any paths
containing 6 or more hops have a DoN 0.2 and below. We do see a negligible number of
paths beyond length 10, which tend to be inflated in length due to alternating hops between
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one AS in different countries or two ASes in the same country, which could indicate a routing
loop when the measurement was conducted.
Figure 4.1: Path Length DoNs
Figure 4.2: Severity of Non-Normal Pathss
Figure 4.2 gives us insight into the number of geographically illogical countries appearing
on each wrong path that was observed. We term any country that is not geographically
normal between sender and receiver, but appears in a transit capacity along the path as
a benefactor. We see that the majority of paths expose data to one or two benefactors.
However, a non-negligible amount of paths still get exposed to traffic to more than 2
benefactors. Keep in mind that this is only one possible metric of path error severity.
One might also wish to consider “intangibles” related to the relationship between, source,
destination, and benefactor nations. For instance, one country may want to avoid exposing
internet traffic to specific countries for political reasons. Another potential metric for path
error severity might consider distance from the last country to the extraneous country. As
an example, consider the path shown in Figure 4.3. This path could be considered more
severely wrong since it crosses the Atlantic Ocean and as opposed to a path which slightly
deviated inside the European continent.
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Figure 4.3: Visualizing of a geographically illogical path from France to Germany. This
path is contained inside a single AS. Both the United States and the United Kingdom benefit
from this path. s
We split the rest of the examining of DoN into the same three levels as in Section 3.0.3
section: country, regional, and AS. Additionally, we split scenarios for each three entities
based on the role of the entity in the path: the data source, the destination, or neither the
source or destination (a transit entity). At the country level we also investigate specific
interesting case studies including the United States, Great Britain, and the Five Eyes, a
known global intelligence sharing agency comprised of the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Great Britain.
4.1.1 Country DoN
When examining country DoN specifically, we filter out countries who are not in a total of
1,000,000 paths in all types of DoN (source, transit, and destination). This leaves us with a
total of 70 countries to examine at a nation state level. Figure 4.4 shows CDFs of the DoN
of countries given their role in a path. Immediately, we see that the DoN for countries follow
the same curve given any role in the path. Furthermore, the average standard deviation
of the three types of DoN for countries is only 0.094, suggesting that the curves are not
matching up by chance but instead because countries lie in approximately the same area on
all three data series. We do see exceptions to this trend. Of particular note is Great Britain,
who has a near global average source and destination DoN (0.490 and 0.545) while having a
transit DoN of just 0.215. Another country of interest is China, who actually has a higher
than global average transit DoN at 0.593, but a much lower source and destination DoN, at
0.384 and 0.417 respectively.
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Figure 4.4: DoN at a country level
While the global average DoN is 0.51, we can see from the CDF that this average is
biased by a minority of countries with more paths than others which are more successful in
avoiding needless exposures. Only roughly a quarter of countries have on average at or above
the global DoN. The North American countries represent an example of countries that have
exceptionally high DoN. We see in Table 4.1 all three countries have extremely high source
and destination DoN, which could be contributed to the vast amount of infrastructure in the
United States and the proximity of the two countries. We do see, however, that the United
States has a much lower transit DoN than its neighbors. We further investigate this trend
in Section 4.1.3, where we look at the United States specifically splitting the cases where it
is transiting traffic that addressed to a destination inside the United States vs traffic bound
for foreign destinations. On the other hand, several countries preform quite poorly. Half the
countries have a DoN of 0.40 or less, with a third of countries having a DoN of less than 0.30
in some roles.
Table 4.1: Every DoN in North America is over the global average, with the exceptions of
the United States exhibiting a significantly lower Transit DoN than its neighbors
Country Source DoN Destination DoN Transit DoN
Canada 0.645 0.628 0.623
Mexico 0.698 0.649 0.732
United States 0.741 0.700 0.513
A visualization of which countries are the biggest benefactors of non-normal paths can
be seen in Figure 4.5. Through this visualization we immediately see that the United States
and Great Britain benefit the most from erroneous paths. In fact, both countries benefit
from at least 3 times the amount of erroneous paths than the next closest country.
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Countries which most often appear as a transit provider are powerful potential path
based adversaries, but how many of the observed paths in the largest path based adversaries
are geographically logical? Table 4.2 shows the countries who transit the most traffic, along
with what fraction of the observed paths is normal. What we see is 8 of the 10 countries
who transit the most traffic have a transit DoN of below the global average DoN, with only
China and the United States being above the average. None of the European countries in
4.2 have a transit DoN over 0.300.
Figure 4.5: The United States and Great Britain benefit from over 3 times the amount of
non-normal paths than the next closest country
Table 4.2: The United States transits over 4 times as much traffic as the next closest
country.











While it is important to see what the raw magnitude nations benefit from the paths they
are in, it is also valuable to consider the ratio of the number of paths a nation benefits from
to the total amount of traffic the nation transits. Figure 4.6 visualizes this ratio. We see that
many countries that have disproportionately small DoNs relative to their network footprint
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are coastal nations, which could suggest that many of the paths they benefit result from
oceanic cable landing points.
Figure 4.6: In coastal countries, we see a much higher ratio of irregular paths to total paths
transited.
Finally, we consider the case where an entity is only transiting traffic on a path: that is,
they are not the source or the destination. This is a particularly important case due to the
fact that many of the paths inside larger countries can end up never leaving the country,
leaving them to be the source, transit, and destination entity in the path. What we find
when considering this foreign-transit-only DoN is that many of the countries who previously
had relatively high transit DoN drop drastically. Table 4.3 shows us just how bad these
countries drop in DoN when being a foreign transit entity on a path. Particularly, we see the
United States go from having a transit DoN of 0.512, to a transit only DoN of 0.082. The
United States can see over 23% of the traffic on the internet that is not starting or ending
within its borders, and only 8% of it is considered geographically normal.
4.1.2 Regional DoN
Next, we examine DoN at a regional level, where we see in Table 4.4 that certain regions
have a better degree of normality when the path is to them than from them. For instance,
the Americas (North, South, and Central) have a higher than average DoN when the path
ends or starts there, but a much lower DoN when they are found transiting data. Part of
this could be explained by the smaller number of countries in the Americas, particularly
North America. When having more adjacent countries, such as in Europe, there are more
choices of countries to route through, and could naturally bring down the DoN for the region.
Furthermore, we see that Asia has a better transit DoN than paths that start or end in the
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Table 4.3: When considering foreign transit, every country performs incredibly poorly. The
United States can see over 23% of foreign traffic and only 8% of that traffic is geographically
normal











region. Finally, we see that as a whole, the only region that has any above average DoN is
the Americas, with Africa actually performing more poorly than the Oceanic region.
Table 4.4: Most regions have close to the same source, destination, and transit DoN.
Region Source DoN Destination Don Transit DoN
Africa 0.174 0.192 0.182
Americas 0.692 0.644 0.522
Asia 0.421 0.412 0.445
Europe 0.400 0.459 0.267
Oceania 0.384 0.296 0.322
Table 4.5 examines DoN on a region to region basis. When staying inside a region, only
the Americas and Oceania have above the overall average DoN. Interestingly, a traceroute
traveling from Europe to the Americas has a better chance of following a normal path than
a path staying inside Europe. Table 4.5 also shows that the DoN from one region to another
is highly symmetrical; the DoN traversing from region 1 to region 2 is typically close to the
DoN when traversing from region 2 to region 1.
4.1.3 Case Studies
We now present case studies of some of the most interesting countries in our measurements:
starting with the United States. Of the over 14 billion examined paths, the United States
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Table 4.5: We see that DoN from region to region is highly symmetrical
To \ From Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania
Africa 0.423 0.151 0.043 0.218 0.009
Americas 0.217 0.814 0.546 0.590 0.640
Asia 0.067 0.649 0.439 0.177 0.174
Europe 0.195 0.642 0.202 0.386 0.133
Oceania 0.016 0.323 0.382 0.102 0.878
showed up in roughly 80% of all of them. Even though they have a transit DoN of above the
global average, the raw amount of traffic that they get exposed to makes them the biggest
benefactor of non-normal paths in terms of raw volume. The United States ends up showing
up in 3,004,163,418 paths that are geographically illogical. Further examining this trend,
Of the 4,246 different source/destination country pairs we have looked at, the United States
benefits from at least one path in 3,848 of them.
The next case study we examine is the Great Britain. Great Britain appears in roughly
25% of all the paths we have examined. Great Britain is a particularly interesting nation
in that the DoN to and from the United Kingdom is over double the DoN of paths that
transit DoN. Great Britain actually benefits from being in 1,885,585,255 paths that we do
not expect them to be in. To further investigate this abnormally low transit DoN versus
source and destination DoN, we visualize the sources countries that great Britain benefits
from in from in Table 4.6. The table shows us that while many of the main benefactors
lie in Europe, their reach is not contained to the region. The top 10 countries they benefit
from includes the United States and portions of Africa and Asia. Great Britain’s influence
in paths in Africa partially explains the exceptionally low regional DoN we see from them
as a region.
We move away from single nations for our next case study and look at the Five Eyes,
an intelligence alliance including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. This is a particularly interesting case study given allegations in the
past several years over massive surveillance, including Five Eyes nations spying on citizens
of other Five Eyes nations in order to circumvent legal protections. Table 4.7 shows the
disparity between the transit DoN of the Five Eyes versus the source and Destination. a
path is 33% less likely to be normal when transiting these countries than when it originates
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Table 4.6: Great Britain benefits from countries in virtually all regions of the globe











or ends there. Recall from Figure 4.4 that generally the source, destination, and transit
DoN for a country are approximately equal. Also of note, the DoN for paths from a five eyes
country to a five eyes country is 0.820, which is 60% higher than the global DoN and much
higher than any type of DoN of the member nations.
Table 4.7: Comparing DoN of the Five Eyes as one entity
Source Transit Destination
0.664 0.446 0.659
To further investigate the Five Eyes, we look at what countries the alliance benefits
from the most. Figure 4.7 visualizes what countries needlessly expose their traffic to the
Five Eyes. Immediately we see that their influence encompasses the entire globe, which can
be explained both by the massive amount of traffic that the entity sees as a whole, and
their distributed geographical presence. Considering the Five Eyes is an intelligence sharing
agency, it is worth noting that 3 of the 5 countries comprising the five eyes lie in the top 10
countries that the entity befits from the most, and all 5 are in the top 16 countries in the
same list.
4.1.4 AS DoN
Finally, we look at DoN at the AS level. Since ASes comprise the entities that actually
are making routing decisions, this helps illustrate what is happening at a network level.
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Figure 4.7: Countries the Five Eyes Benefits From
Here, we only consider ASes that are in over 50,000 paths in all types of DoN (source,
destination, and transit). This leaves us with 560 core transit ASes outside the Internet’s
default free zone to consider. Figure 4.8 shows that in general, the DoN for paths transiting
most ASes and ending in most ASes follow the same curve. However, the curve for paths
from ASes demonstrates a trend of higher DoN, suggesting that a minority of the sources,
by AS, contribute to poor DoN. We also, as one would expect, see a higher average standard
deviation in AS DoN than countries, at 0.148.
Figure 4.8: General AS DoN
Next we want to examine if, when an AS introduces transit infrastructure that is not
located in a geographically normal country into a path, is that illogical country consistent for
the AS, or do ASes expose traffic to a diverse collection of countries? It turns that of the 560
ASes we consider, 383 (68%) of them expose traffic to a single, consistent, illogical country.
Of course outliers exist, with one AS actually seeing non-normal data in 32 countries. We
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are also interested in, when an AS exposes traffic to a single country, is that country where
they are legally registered at? In all 383 countries that benefit from a single country those
ASes only benefit the country they are registered in.
To further investigate DoN at an AS level, we examined when erroneous countries show
up in the path, attempting to answer the question: do ”bad” countries get visited on the
boundaries of ASes, or when traveling inside an AS? It turns out that the majority of the
errors that occur in paths happen on the edge of ASes. Of the over 10 billion errors we
have examined, 6,445,982,120 (64%) happen on the edge of ASes. Certainly in some of
these instances geographically illogical decisions are being made for financial gain due to AS
relationships, however, in 44% of the appearances of illogical countries, the error happens
inside an AS, where there is not an immediately clear business reason to make such a decision.
Next, we look at these internal AS errors in one specific case, single AS paths. In
Figure 4.3 we saw an example of path with a single AS that was considered geographically
non-normal. We attempt to further investigate this specific trend here. Of the 560 ASes
we consider in this Section, 424 of them were actually not involved in a single non-normal
path that only included themselves. It is important to note that this could also mean that
they were never involved in a path that only included themselves. This means that the
94,123,432 non-normal paths that involved a single AS were influenced by only 136 total
ASes. Figure 4.9 looks at the distribution of these ASes in terms of how many single AS
paths they were involved in that were non-normal. There we see that even of the remaining
136 ASes involved in these paths, a small minority of them comprise the majority of the
paths.
Now let us examine the countries that benefit the most from these single AS paths.
We see in Table 4.8 that the top 10 countries in terms of the number of single AS paths
they benefit from. Immediately, we once again see the United States at the top of the list.
Furthermore, we see many European countries, which could be explained due to ASes having
infrastructure in multiple European countries as well as the general low DoN of Europe as a
Region.
Finally, we look at what source/destination country pairs are involved in these non-
normal single AS paths. Table 4.9 shows 4 of the top 5 source/destination pairs in terms of
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Figure 4.9: Number of non-normal single AS paths ASes were involved in
Table 4.8: Countries which benefit from geographically illogical single-AS paths.











number of paths end up in the same country they started in. This is particularly worrying,
due to the fact that a single AS has full autonomy over the path, the path should never leave
the nation it started in, yet we see that these paths do end up outside of their source and
destination.
4.2 Legal Exposure
While looking at paths from a purely physical standpoint is important, we also want to
consider how geographically normal a path when additionally considering countries that can
exert legal control over an AS transiting traffic. To do this, we take every physical AS,
country tuple path we have and map the as back to the country it was registered in. If we
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Table 4.9: 4 of the top 5 source/destination pairs for single AS non-normal paths are the
same country. This is particularly worrying, as the AS has full control over the path and
still leaves the country.
Source Country Destination Country Non-Normal Single AS Paths
United States United States 15,706,670
Spain Spain 7,405,173
Great Britain Great Britain 3,769,939
Tanzania France 3,243,382
Netherlands Netherlands 2,998,219
do not know the country of registration for any of the ASes on the path, we simply skip the
path and do not consider it.
In doing this, we still ended up with a set of over 14.5 billion paths to consider the
normality of from a legal standpoint. If we ignore the countries where infrastructure is
physically located, and purely legal control over the AS, the global DoN is 0.506. This is
only slightly lower than the physical DoN. Considering many ASes only have infrastructure
in one country, this DoN almost mirroring the physical DoN makes sense.
Perhaps more interesting, is when we consider the union of physical and legal exposure.
To do this, we consider every path as if they traversed both the legal and physical countries
on the path and compare that set of countries to our set of normal countries for the physical
location of the source/destination pair. Figure 4.10 shows how many countries were typically
added to the path when considering the union rather than simply the physical exposure. We
see that about 80% of the paths actually traverse the same set of countries, however around
20% of path add one or more countries when legal pressure is also considered.
Figure 4.10: Number of Added Countries by Unioning the Legal and Physical Countries
traversed
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Finally, we consider the DoN of the above unioned set. In other words, we consider
what fraction of the total paths are normal when we consider both the legal and physical
countries they traverse. As one would expect after looking at Figure 4.10, the overall DoN of
these unioned paths is 0.425, almost 10% lower than the physical and legal DoN. Figure 4.11
looks at this union DoN as the length of the path grows. There, we see that as the path
gets longer, the DoN drops quickly. This makes sense due to the fact that every added hop
on the path could potentially add 2 different countries to the countries traversed. Finally,
we consider the above union DoN at a country level, breaking down further into when the
country is the physical source and the physical destination of the path. Figure 4.12 looks
exceptionally similar to Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.11: DoN as a function of path length.
Figure 4.12: CDF of DoN at a country level when the union of physical and legal exposure
is considered.
While one might automatically assume that the added legally bad paths can be attributed
to the United States due to the number of ASes registered to the US. When we examine who
the added benefactors of legal paths are this turns out to not be true. Table 4.10 shows us
the top 10 countries in terms of paths benefited from legally. We immediately see that this
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does not mirror the physical benefactors of paths, instead many European countries jump
to the top of the list, with the US appearing in position number 6.
Table 4.10: The nations who benefit the most legally from paths do not necessarily match
the nations who benefit physically.













In this work, we have examined the extent the Internet’s routing infrastructure needlessly
exposes network traffic to different nations. We have developed a unique infrastructure for
doing so by creating defining what a ”normal” geographic path is between two countries
through the use of convex hulls. Next, we quantified the amount of normal and irregular
traffic between two entities through the use of our defined degree of normality. In the over
14.5 billion paths we have examined, 49% of them unnecessarily expose network traffic to at
least one nation. Furthermore, we have examined what nations, regions, and ASes benefit
and expose this network traffic to geographically irrelevant countries. Finally, we examined
the legal countries that each measured path traversed to determine what countries have
legal jurisdiction over the traversed ASes in each measured path. When considering both
the physical and legal countries that each path crosses, over 57% of paths expose traffic to
at least one nation.
Future Work In the future, we plan to expand our measurements to look at countries
that see temporary, but marked, changes in their DoN, and attempt to establish the root
cause of such changes. We are interested in examining if adversarial actions could result in a
temporarily reduced DoN for nations, or if particular nations could inordinately benefit from
adversarial reductions in DoN. Lastly, we wish to examine if nations can adjust their routing
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